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WHY BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD ANIMALS 
ROBERT H. SCHMIDT, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Utah State University, Logan, Utah 84322-5210 
ABSTRACT: The terms "good" and "bad" are completely subjective, yet the public has expectations that wildlife damage 
management professionals "do bad things to good animals." It is argued that wildlife damage management decisions are made 
in a value-laden context, with science in a supportive role. The principle of collective human values is the driving force of 
society's concerns, and collective values are currently highlighting animal welfare and other environmental concerns. Wildlife 
damage management professionals could modify their operational paradigm from a focus on populations of animals to a focus 
on aggregations of individual animals in order to respond proactively to both emerging and recognized social values. 
Proc. 15th Vertebrate Pest Conf. (J. E. Borrecco & R. E. Marsh, 
Editors) Published at University of Calif., Davis. 1992 
INTRODUCTION 
"Do we have to kill the mouse?" 
"I don't want the animal hurt... it won't hurt, will it?" 
"Why do bad things happen to good animals?" 
Given enough time, all wildlife damage management 
professionals will be asked these or similar questions. His-
torically, many professionals have ridiculed, in public and 
private, all types of "emotional" questions. However, these 
"emotional" questions are now recognized as legitimate by a 
significant and growing proportion of the public. This is the 
same public that spends its dollars to solve wildlife damage 
problems and the same public that votes for the politicians 
who make decisions on how federal and state dollars are 
appropriated and spent. Wildlife damage management pro-
fessionals need to provide logical, understandable, and sensi-
tive answers to the people asking these questions. This essay 
is my attempt to provide a framework for understanding the 
complexity of "emotional" questions, and to develop a strat-
egy for preserving the professionalism and utility of those 
attempting to solve wildlife damage problems within these 
societal constraints. 
DO BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD 
ANIMALS? 
The question, "Do bad things happen to good animals," 
begs to be answered in two parts. First, are animals good or 
bad? Second, what is defined as a "bad thing" happening to 
an animal? In this essay, I am specifically referring to non-
domesticated wild vertebrates, although there may be rel-
evance to domesticated vertebrates. 
"If an animal walked through the woods, and no human 
was there to recognize it, could it still be a good animal?" 
The question is meant to be rhetorical, but the key point is 
that "good" and "bad" are human value labels. Are the Los 
Angeles Raiders a good or a bad football team? Did you 
receive a good or bad recommendation from your last job? Is 
a gray wolf (Canis lupus) a good or a bad animal? The an-
swers to these three questions require the human element: to 
whom are you speaking? The adequacy of the Raiders as a 
football team depends on whether your hero is a member of 
the team, or where in the country you live, or whether you 
won or lost money on them in the office betting pool. An 
employment recommendation may be considered negative if 
it concludes that you cannot be trusted to handle large sums 
of money, but perfect if you desire to run for public office. 
And wolves, depending on whether you are a cattle rancher, a 
birdwatcher, a politician, a steelworker, a wilderness enthusi- 
ast, or a wildlife damage management professional, are 
quickly labeled "good" or "bad". In addition to there being a 
lack of consensus from person to person about the goodness 
or wickedness of a particular animal, humans retain the flex-
ibility to change their mind when convenient. Thus, the same 
individual may, at differing times in his or her life, fear the 
big, bad wolf, pester the parents to see the icky wolves at the 
zoo, attend collegiate rallies to "save the wolf," raise a family 
and care less about wolves, be angry because wolves ate the 
family dog, repent and donate money to a "save the wolf 
organization, and, to end the cycle, go senile and care less 
about wolves again. Thus, "good" and "bad" labels, to be 
used effectively, require a great deal of qualifiers, assump-
tions, and definitions. 
Even if people were consistent in their labeling of ani-
mals as "good" or "bad," how are animals to be labeled when 
nobody cares, or when nobody is around? For example, were 
dinosaurs, seen by no human eyes, good or bad? In more 
recent times, a new species of monkey, the black-faced lion 
tamarin (Leontopithecus caissara), was discovered on an is-
land off the coast of Brazil in 1990. Was this rare mammal 
good or bad prior to being found? Following the discovery of 
the black-faced lion tamarin, there were probably none who 
would label it "bad". At some future point in time, perhaps 
when a resort is planned for the island of Superagui, feelings 
may change. 
Animals, of course, are neither good nor bad. They are 
simply animals. Goodness and malfeasance are human value 
labels. You can label animals as you wish. Since I label ani-
mals as good—and this is my qualifier—at being animals, I 
have no difficulty with the "good" label. Alternative opinions 
require a simple majority vote of one. 
The second part of the question, "Do bad things happen 
to good animals," also requires clarification and explanation. 
Do "bad things" happen to animals? I can't speak for a 
female mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) plucked from her nest 
by a foraging red fox (Vulpes vulpes), or a California vole 
(Microtus californicus) stepped on by a black-tailed deer 
(Odocoileus hemionus), but I would think that the mallard 
and the vole have very different opinions than the fox and the 
deer concerning the appropriateness of the event! Again, I 
have to argue that before humans appeared on the scene, 
before the concepts of good and bad were first uttered by 
humanoid lips, animals "did their thing." Today, that "thing" 
is still being done. 
Humans do things to wild animals, however. Millions of 
coyotes (Canis latrans), striped skunks (Mephitis mephitis), 
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beaver (Castor canadensis), raccoons (Procyon lotor), opos-
sum (Didelphis virginiana), nutria (Myocastor coypus), foxes 
(Vulpes and Urocyon spp.) and deer (Odocoileus spp.) are 
killed by legal hunting, trapping, and wildlife damage man-
agement programs every year. Some animals simply are in 
the wrong place at the wrong time. For example, 6,625 ani-
mals were killed inadvertently in the process of attempting to 
resolve damage complaints in 1988 (Animal Damage Con-
trol 1990). In the United States alone, tens of thousands of 
deer and hundreds of thousands of birds and small mammals 
are killed by vehicles on the highways every year. Millions of 
animals, of all varieties, are killed directly or indirectly 
through the process of displacement from agricultural, resi-
dential, manufacturing, and even recreational activities. Are 
these good things or bad things happening to these animals? 
Obviously, who you talk to in order to answer this question 
defines the response you will receive. Through my capitalis-
tic, value-tainted eyes, I can accept responsibility for a por-
tion of those deaths. What should be my professional 
response? Before I answer that, I need to elaborate on the 
"principle of collective human values." 
THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE HUMAN 
VALUES 
It is becoming increasingly clear that natural resource 
management decisions, long thought to be ruled and defined 
by science or economics, are in fact driven by human values. 
I call this phenomenon the "principle of collective human 
values." In brief, the principle of collective human values 
states that the sum total of human values bearing on an issue 
determines the degree and extent of natural resource manage-
ment decisions and processes. Old-growth redwoods (Sequoia 
sempervirens) were originally cut because humans collec-
tively put more value in redwood products and economic 
development than in old-growth forest preservation. Today, 
that collective value judgment is shifting, and old-growth 
forest values are increasing relative to the traditional exploi-
tation values. A similar shift is occurring in other natural 
resource arenas: wilderness use and preservation, grazing on 
public lands, endangered species, hunting and trapping, and 
the fate of wildlife involved in wildlife damage management 
activities. As an example, the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 was a consequence of collective human values at the 
time of its passage. Its revision in 1992 will be a continued 
reflection of those values. It will alienate some and be pro-
claimed as severely compromised by others, but collective 
human values, as manifested in the political process, will 
determine its shape. Natural resources require sophisticated 
and reasoned management, based in science, and human val-
ues are an inescapable and essential part of the management 
equation (Wagner 1989, Decker et al. 1991). 
The United States is always in a state of transition. This 
transition covers many fronts: education, population and de-
mographics, economics, natural resources... the list can be as 
broad or as narrow as one wishes. The nation is becoming 
more urbanized and the value set of its citizens is changing, 
partly because of this urbanization, and partly because value 
sets are never stagnant, but are constantly evolving (Timm 
1992, Schmidt et al. 1992). What most professional natural 
resource managers fail to understand is that science, the back-
bone of their training, has no opinion on whether there should 
be a single mountain lion (Felis concolor), redwood tree, or 
dairy cow in California. It is not a science question whether 
the entire state of California should be paved or abandoned; 
whether mule deer should be hunted; whether redwood trees 
should be totally protected or whether they should all be cut 
tomorrow; or whether California ground squirrels (Spermo-
philus beecheyi) are allowed to live their lives without risk of 
pesticide intoxication. Science cannot answer these questions. 
What science can do is tell us the consequences of these 
actions, tell us how these actions can be accomplished, or 
how these actions might be reversed. Again, however, sci-
ence has no opinion on the question of whether they should 
be done or not. That answer comes from human values and 
ethics which, as you well know, are not narrow or uniform. 
Societal values rule over science, not vice versa (Chelimsky 
1991). Values tell us how science is to be applied. Values also 
tell us how wildlife is to be managed, now and in the future. 
Collective values tell us the direction, scope, and intensity of 
that management. Collective values tell us how the public 
accepts whether bad things can or should happen to good 
animals. 
DEVELOPING A PHILOSOPHICAL PARADIGM 
SHIFT IN WILDLIFE DAMAGE  
MANAGEMENT 
Within the field of wildlife damage management, I feel 
that our current philosophical paradigm can be paraphrased 
as follows: "Modern wildlife damage management controls 
excess nuisance populations." There is an emphasis on ani-
mal populations. Populations are measured by numbers: how 
large, how dense, how many births, how many deaths, and 
emigration and immigration rates, for example. These con-
cepts tend to be ignored by the public as reflected in society's 
concerns. Populations don't bleed. Populations aren't killed. 
Populations don't scream. Bad things don't happen to good 
populations. Bad things happen to good individuals. 
I believe it is time to develop a new philosophical para-
digm in wildlife damage management which can be para-
phrased as follows: "Modern wildlife damage management 
manipulates individual animals to reduce or eliminate dam-
aging behaviors." What are the consequences of this shift, 
and is it justified? 
First, this paradigm shift focuses on a professional re-
sponsibility to individual animals in a population, not just 
"abstract" populations or species. It personalizes actions. So-
ciety tells us that they view our actions as affecting individual 
animals. We need to be able to tell them that we understand 
the consequences of our action on individual animals, and 
that the public can trust us that we share their concerns. This 
should apply whether we are involved in managing a single 
dog food-eating raccoon or the management of a blackbird 
roost containing 10,000,000 individual birds. 
It is easier to rationalize a non-lethal focus when you 
deal with individuals versus populations. Individuals are ma-
nipulated, not controlled. According to Webster's New Col-
legiate Dictionary, "manipulation" means to "manage or 
utilize skillfully" or to "change by artful...means so as to 
serve one's purpose." "Control" means to "exercise restrain-
ing or directing influence over" or to "have power over." In 
today's social climate, "manipulate" seems more politically 
correct than "control." Again, the collective human values of 
society are asking us, as professionals, to develop non-lethal 
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strategies for resolving wildlife damage conflicts. We should 
accept that responsibility. 
Second, focusing on individual animals assists in devel-
oping wildlife damage management policies which can rec-
ognize society's concerns over the welfare of individual 
animals. Techniques and policies can be assessed and devel-
oped with these concerns not treated as oversights, but as 
driving forces sensitive to public concerns (Schmidt 1989). 
Damage problems can still be resolved with existing practical 
methods. This is a key element, since professional responsi-
bilities require that problems be resolved to the best of our 
abilities. 
Is a focus on individual animals legitimizing the emo-
tional sides of pro- versus anti-management debates? I be-
lieve this is a moot question. Collective human values have 
dictated to wildlife damage management professionals that 
emotional questions are legitimate, and that the public re-
quires a professional response to their questions. We need to 
give them the answers. That is our role as professionals 
(Schmidt et al. 1992). To ignore this challenge is to accept the 
loss of public trust, a rare and easily lost commodity (Slovic 
et al. 1991). The public wants our assistance in stopping bad 
things that happen to good animals. 
CONCLUSIONS 
What kind of system for managing wildlife damage is-
sues is wanted in the United States? What techniques should 
be used? People have a variety of values which result in a 
variety of management possibilities. But which value is the 
correct one? Which value system is best for the short-term, 
and is that also the value system best for the long-term? 
The trap we must avoid is the blank declaration that the 
public is ignorant, but with the proper educational inputs, the 
public will "see it our way." Do we really expect over 200 
million people to become wildlife damage specialists? At the 
same time, perhaps these millions should become nuclear 
physicists, lawyers, and short-order cooks. Remember, as our 
profession decries the public's ignorance, other professional 
specialties within that same "public" are decrying our igno-
rance in some other topic. We are all specialists, yet we are all 
ignorant. It is unreasonable to expect that our nation will 
become a nation of wildlife damage specialists. Instead of 
convincing the public to change, our goal should be to under-
stand and meet these desires, while at the same time encour-
aging awareness of the complexities of the issues. 
We must agree that something has to be done, that the 
result of a lack of a plan of action will lead not only to 
increasing economic upheaval but also to a potential destruc-
tion of human and wildlife resources: timber, huntable and 
viewable wildlife, plant and animal agriculture, jobs, fisher-
ies, and even human lives. My sense of the value system of 
the country tells me that the procedures and mechanisms for 
maintaining agriculture and wildlife in the country into the 
future is a very high priority. 
Where does this leave the professional natural resource 
manager? Well, for starters, understanding society's role in 
driving resource management decisions means that the pro-
fessionals aren't surprised when the various values out there 
collide. In fact, these conflicts should be anticipated and even 
part of management decisions and processes. The National 
Environmental Policy Act recognizes this value-driven sys-
tem, requiring a scoping process which allows the various 
values to become public information. We need to make sure 
that we understand the publics' values on a wide variety of 
issues. For the wildlife biologist, this means understanding 
the emerging role of animal welfare considerations in shap-
ing social opinions and concerns (Schmidt 1990). 
Why do bad things happen to good animals? Because 
the collective human values of today say that animals are 
good, and that animal suffering is bad. Alas, we do not have 
the wisdom of a benevolent dictator to tell us what to do. 
Fallible, manipulable humans must plan their own destiny, 
and live with the results. We must learn from our mistakes, 
and from the mistakes of others, to do things right. Aldo 
Leopold (1970:251), trained as a forester, wrote in his book/1 
Sand County Almanac that "... a system of conservation 
based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. 
... It assumes, falsely, I think, that the economic parts of the 
biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts." 
Using a similar analogy, it is unwise to assume that we can 
function as wildlife damage professionals without consider-
ing the big picture, and to leave out part of that picture means 
that our professional clock must eventually begin to tell the 
incorrect time. Our professional responsibility lies in keeping 
track of our many clocks, and in keeping those many clocks 
working correctly. 
Professional resource managers do not operate in the 
vacuum that they sometimes feel they are entitled. They work 
in a value-laden system that often conflicts with their own 
personal values. If their best professional, scientific, and 
value-laden judgments conflict with those of society at large, 
well, there is no crime in that for anybody. It is the system 
that we live in today. And everybody, including the resource 
manager, has a say. 
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